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ABSTRACT
Objectives: To compare the prevalence of self-
reported risky driving in a sample of UK military
personnel at 2 different time points (2004 and 2009),
and to identify the incidence of new onset risky driving
and possible determinants of becoming a new risky
driver.
Methods: Data were used from 2 phases of a military
cohort study investigating the health and well-being of
UK military personnel between 2004 and 2009.
Participants were included if they were undertaking
regular (rather than reserve) engagements, had
completed both surveys and reported being a driver at
both surveys. Univariable and multivariable logistic
regression analyses were performed to examine the
relationship between risky driving status and
sociodemographic and military characteristics. Data
analysis was conducted in 2011.
Results: The prevalence of risky driving reduced from
18% to 14%, over an average of 3.3 years. The
incidence of new onset risky driving was 7%.
Predictors for becoming a new risky driver were:
younger age, not being in a relationship at phase 2 and
harmful alcohol use. Those deployed after 2007 were
less likely to become risky drivers following
deployment, compared with those deployed before
2007 (adjusted OR 0.62 (95% CI 0.40 to 0.95)).
Conclusions: The prevalence of becoming a risky
driver appears to have reduced over time. This paper
suggests a number of explanations for this reduction,
including changes in the way that the UK military have
dealt with road safety with the introduction of the road
safety campaign (in 2007).
INTRODUCTION
Road trafﬁc accidents (RTAs) are the leading
causes of death in young people in the USA
and UK.1 2 Deaths from RTAs are also a par-
ticular problem in the UK military. In 2006,
the number of deaths due to land transport
accidents (unrelated to hostile action) in the
UK regular Armed Forces was 435% higher
than in the general population (standardised
mortality ratio (SMR): 535, 95% CI 416 to
687).3 In 2006, the single largest cause of death
was land transport accidents, accounting for
59 deaths (31% of all deaths) in the UK
regular Armed Forces.4 We know from a
previous study that the self-reported prevalence
of risky driving in the UKmilitary is 19%.5
Risk factors for RTAs in military and
general populations include being male,
young, unmarried and of lower educational
attainment,6–9 and within military popula-
tions, combat experience appears to confer a
higher risk,10–13 although this diminishes
with time after deployment.14–16 A recent
study of American veterans from the Iraq
and Afghanistan conﬂicts suggested they per-
formed more poorly on a driving-simulator
assessment, compared with a civilian control
group, raising further concerns about driving
safety after leaving military service.17
There is some evidence that road safety
campaigns reduce the number of RTAs.
A meta-analysis of 67 studies of road safety
campaigns from 12 countries between 1975
and 2007 showed overall a 9% reduction in
RTAs.18 The UK Armed Forces developed a
campaign to reduce risky driving in military
personnel immediately following deployment
in a satirical video called the ‘Grim
Reaper’.19 This has been shown to UK mili-
tary personnel returning from deployment
since September 2007.
The objective of this study was to compare
the prevalence of self-reported risky driving
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ A road safety campaign was introduced for mili-
tary personnel returning from deployment; this is
the first study to assess whether there is any evi-
dence the campaign was effective.
▪ The results presented here used data from two
phases of a military cohort study investigating
the health and well-being of UK military person-
nel between 2004 and 2009 and allow us to
assess changes in driving behaviours over time.
▪ Not all participants responded to both surveys;
however, the analyses have taken account of
response weights.
▪ Capturing risky behaviours through self-report
can be prone to bias, thus participants may have
under-reported risky driving.
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in the same sample of UK military personnel at two dif-
ferent time points using data from the King’s Centre for
Military Health Research’s (KCMHR) Military Cohort
Study.20 21 In addition, to identify the incidence of new
onset risky driving and the determinants of becoming a
new risky driver, particularly whether the road safety
campaign introduced in the military in 2007 had an
impact on self-reported risky driving.
METHODS
Data source
Data were used from phases 1 and 2 of the KCMHR
Military Cohort Study.20 21 These were the ﬁrst and
second phases of an ongoing cohort study of UK mili-
tary personnel assessing physical and mental health con-
sequences of deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan.
Phase 1 data were collected between June 2004 and
March 2006 and phase 2 between November 2007 and
September 2009. There were 10 305 participants at
phase 1 (response rate was 58.9%). In total, 6429 partici-
pants completed phase 2 (follow-up response rate
68.4%). Response at phase 2 was associated with older
age, being female, being an ofﬁcer and being of regular
engagement type. There was no evidence that response
was associated with mental health status.20
Variables
Data on a wide range of sociodemographic, military and
health factors were collected via self-completed question-
naires at both phases. For the purposes of these analyses,
the following variables were considered.
Risky driving
Risky driving has been deﬁned as anyone who sometimes,
seldom, or never wears a seatbelt; or who drives more than
10 miles/h (mph) above the limit (10 mph is equivalent to
16 km/h (kph)) in a built-up area, or more than 20 mph
above the limit on a motorway (20 mph is equivalent to
32 kph). Questions on seatbelt usage and speeding were
adapted from the study by Bell et al6 and this deﬁnition
has been used previously.5 Self-reported risky driving
behaviours from both phases were used to deﬁne per-
sonnel as: non-risky at both phases, risky at phase 1 but
not phase 2, risky at phase 2 but not phase 1 and risky at
both phases.
Static variables
Static sociodemographic and military factors taken from
phase 1 included sex, educational attainment, childhood
antisocial behaviour, rank, service and role in parent
unit. A measure of childhood antisocial behaviour22 23
deﬁned as anyone who ‘often used to get into physical
ﬁghts at school’, and either ‘often used to play truant
from school’, or ‘was suspended or expelled from
school’, or ‘did things that should have got them (or did
get them) into trouble with the police’.
Sociodemographic factors from phase 2 also included
age, marital status and ever having deployed to Iraq or
Afghanistan. There were seven questions on potentially
traumatic deployment experiences, collected at phase 2,
which were summed and collapsed into three categories
(no experiences, 1–3 experiences, 4+experiences) for
analysis: did you ‘give aid to wounded’, ‘see personnel
seriously wounded or killed’, ‘come under small arm/
rocket propelled grenade (RPG) ﬁre’, ‘come under
mortar/artillery ﬁre/rocket attack’, ‘experience a land-
mine strike’, ‘experience hostility from Iraqi/Afghani
civilians’ and ‘handle bodies’.
Dynamic variables
The following dynamic variables were generated: age
change between survey points in whole years, age group
change (remained under 35 years, became over 35 years,
stayed over 35 years; 35 years was taken as the cut-off as
cross-tabulations indicated that risky driving showed a
decline after this age), deployed since phase 1, left
service, change in relationship status, change in alcohol
misuse status and had a RTA. Alcohol misuse was
deﬁned as having a score of ≥16 on the WHO’s Alcohol
Use Disorders Identiﬁcation Test (AUDIT) which signi-
ﬁes the harmful use of alcohol.24 Among personnel
deployed between phases 1 and 2, two further dynamic
variables were generated; years since last deployment
was the time since last deployment to phase 2 question-
naire completion, and deployment after the release of
the Grim Reaper video was classiﬁed as anyone deploy-
ing after September 2007.
Study sample
The sample comprised of personnel who had completed
both phases 1 and 2 of the KCMHR cohort study. Only
regular personnel were included. Reservists were
excluded because they often have military roles, social
backgrounds and postdeployment experiences that
differ to regulars.21 25 Finally, only those who were
drivers at both phases were included (see online supple-
mentary ﬁgure A1).
Statistical analysis
Overall prevalence of risky driving at both phases, by age
and service, was calculated. The distribution of phase 1
baseline and phase 2 sociodemographic and military
characteristics by risky driving status were tabulated to
examine the relationship between them. Univariable and
multivariable logistic regression analyses were performed
to examine the relationship between new onset risky
driving and the dynamic variables. Subgroup analyses
were carried out among personnel deploying between
phases 1 and 2, to examine the effect of deploying before
or after the Grim Reaper video on risky driving status.
ORs, 95% CIs and two-sided p values are presented.
Response weights were generated to account for non-
response. Response weights were deﬁned as the inverse
probability of responding once sampled and were gener-
ated using factors shown empirically to predict response
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(sex, rank, age). The weighted analyses provide valid
results under the assumption that the data are missing at
random and that the observed variables modelled to
drive non-response were correctly identiﬁed.20 All ana-
lyses were performed using STATAV.11.0.
RESULTS
Of 8154 drivers at phase 1,i 5020 (61.6%) responded to
phase 2 and were still drivers, and formed the sample
for these analyses (see online supplementary ﬁgure A1).
Those lost to follow-up at phase 2 were more likely to be
risky drivers at phase 1 (664/3081, 21.6%) compared
with those followed up (845/5073, 16.7%; based on a χ2
test, p<0.001).
Prevalence of risky driving
Among the sample, 17.8% were risky drivers at phase 1,
and 13.6% were risky drivers at phase 2 (table 1). The
overall prevalence of risky driving was greater among
male Army and Navy personnel, at both phases (table 1).
Changes in risky driving status
There was a strong association between risky driving
status at phases 1 and 2 (p<0.001). The incidence of
new onset risky driving was 7% (276/4143) (table 2).
The average time elapsed between phases 1 and 2 was
3.29 years (SD 0.62). Generally, the non-risky drivers at
both phases (n=3867, 76.4%) were older, reported less
childhood antisocial behaviour, more educational quali-
ﬁcations, were more commonly in the Navy or RAF,
more likely to be married at phase 2, were more likely to
be ofﬁcers, more likely to be in a non-combat role and
less likely to have ever been deployed than those drivers
who were risky at any or both phases (table 3).
Personnel under 35 years of age at phase 1 were more
likely to become risky drivers (whether they aged into the
above 35 category or not), compared with phase 1
personnel who were over 35 years old (table 4).
Personnel who were not in a relationship at phase 2, and
personnel who had ever misused alcohol, were more
likely to become risky drivers by phase 2. There was some
evidence that being deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan was
associated with an increased chance of becoming a risky
driver; however, the effect was removed after adjusting for
the dynamic variables. Among non-risky drivers at phase
1 who had deployed between the phases, personnel who
had deployed after the release of the Grim Reaper video
were less likely to become risky drivers (table 5).
The overall number of traumatic deployment experi-
ences was lower after the introduction of the Grim Reaper
video campaign in 2007 (of the 1760 participants deploy-
ing between phases 1 and 2, 822/941 participants (87%)
reported at least one traumatic event before the cam-
paign, compared with 627/762 (82%) after its release).
However, after adding traumatic deployment experiences
to the second model in table 5, deploying after the intro-
duction of Grim Reaper video campaign was still asso-
ciated with a reduced risk of becoming a risky driver (OR
0.62, 95% CI 0.40 to 0.96; data not shown).
DISCUSSION
Main findings
Among a cohort of UK military personnel, the preva-
lence of risky driving reduced from 17.8% to 13.6%,
over an average time period of 3.29 years. The incidence
of new onset risky driving was 7%. Risk factors for
Table 1 Distribution of risky driving at each phase by age, sex and service
Phase 1
N, % (95% CI)
Phase 2
N, % (95% CI)
All 834/4987 (17.8 (16.7 to 18.8)) 639/5009 (13.6 (12.5 to 14.5))
By sex
Male 786/4515 (18.4 (17.2 to 19.6)) 597/4534 (14.0 (12.9 to 15.0))
Female 48/472 (10.5 (7.7 to 13.3)) 42/475 (9.0 (6.4 to 11.6))
By service
Navy 30/152 (20.2 (13.7 to 26.7)) 25/152 (16.7 (10.7 to 22.7))
Royal Marines 84/701 (12.6 (10.1 to 15.2)) 59/705 (9.2 (6.9 to 11.4))
Army 644/3011 (22.6 (21.1 to 24.2)) 479/3026 (16.7 (15.3 to 18.1))
Royal Air Force 76/1123 (6.7 (5.5 to 8.5)) 76/1126 (7.0 (5.5 to 8.5))
Analyses are adjusted for non-response weights.
Table 2 Risky driving status among a cohort of 4976
regular personnel with risky driving status available at
phases 1 and 2
Risky driving status at phase 1
Risky, n (%) Non-risky, n (%) n
Risky driving status at phase 2
Risky 359 (43.7) 276 (7.0) 635
Non-risky 474 (56.3) 3867 (93.0) 4341
N 833 (100) 4143 (100) 4976
Analyses are adjusted for non-response weights.
iPaper on risky driving at phase 1 analysed a total of 8127 participants.
However, 29 late responders (who were regulars and drive) have since
been added to the data set, and two participants were removed due to
errors.
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becoming a risky driver included: younger age, not
being in a relationship at phase 2, and alcohol misuse at
either or both phases. Those deployed after 2007, when
the road safety campaign was introduced, were less likely
to become risky drivers following deployment, compared
with those deployed before 2007.
Reduction in risky driving
The reduction in the prevalence of risky driving among
our sample may reﬂect the effect of increasing age, the
introduction of a road safety campaign, a possible
change in the nature of deployments and/or possible
changes in driving practices on deployment.
Owing to the nature of our study design, participants
aged by an average of 3.3 years between the two phases.
We would expect increasing age alone to reduce risky
driving behaviours. Studies show that in military popula-
tions younger drivers are more likely to report risky beha-
viours.5 However, we suggest that age alone is unlikely to
fully account for the reduction in risky driving.
Table 3 Sociodemographic and military characteristics of the follow-up sample, at P2, by risky driving status (N=5020*)
Variable
All
n (%)
Risky driver
at P1 and P2
n (%)
Risky driver
at P1 only
n (%)
Risky driver
at P2 only
n (%)
Non-risky
at P1 and P2
n (%)
All 5020 (100) 359 (7.8) 474 (10.0) 276 (5.8) 3867 (76.4)
Sociodemographic factors
Age (years)
<25 100 (2.7) 15 (5.3) 13 (3.5) 10 (4.7) 60 (2.1)
25–29 795 (19.1) 103 (32.9) 109 (26.7) 58 (24.7) 517 (16.3)
30–34 964 (19.7) 86 (23.4) 130 (27.6) 72 (25.9) 669 (17.8)
35–39 1243 (23.9) 84 (21.4) 118 (23.0) 73 (24.9) 959 (24.2)
40+ 1918 (34.7) 71 (17.0) 104 (19.2) 63 (19.8) 1662 (39.6)
Gender
Male 4545 (91.3) 343 (96.1) 442 (93.9) 251 (92.0) 3468 (90.4)
Female 475 (8.7) 16 (3.9) 32 (6.1) 25 (8.1) 399 (9.6)
Marital status
Married/cohabiting 4181 (83.0) 279 (77.7) 384 (80.9) 203 (72.7) 3277 (84.5)
Single 437 (9.4) 46 (13.1) 49 (10.8) 33 (13.1) 304 (8.5)
Separated/widowed/divorced 386 (7.7) 33 (9.2) 40 (8.3) 39 (14.3) 273 (7.1)
Childhood antisocial behaviour
No 4184 (83.1) 226 (62.6) 351 (73.6) 210 (77.1) 3357 (86.8)
Yes 799 (16.9) 130 (37.4) 120 (26.4) 61 (22.9) 485 (13.2)
Educational qualifications
None 313 (6.7) 32 (9.5) 39 (8.5) 28 (11.2) 211 (5.8)
Ordinary levels or equivalent 1725 (38.0) 132 (40.0) 192 (44.1) 107 (42.7) 1273 (36.5)
Advanced levels or equivalent 1676 (35.8) 132 (38.3) 158 (34.5) 86 (33.8) 1291 (36.0)
University degree or equivalent 1054 (19.6) 50 (12.3) 69 (12.9) 38 (12.4) 889 (21.7)
In service at P2
Yes 3570 (71.0) 262 (72.3) 357 (75.0) 198 (71.2) 2721 (70.3)
No 1445 (29.0) 97 (27.7) 117 (25.0) 78 (28.8) 1141 (29.7)
Military factors
Rank
Other (including NCO’s) 3726 (78.2) 302 (87.2) 380 (83.5) 226 (85.2) 2781 (76.0)
Officer 1294 (21.8) 57 (12.8) 94 (16.5) 50 (14.8) 1086 (24.1)
Service
Naval 705 (13.6) 30 (8.1) 54 (10.9) 27 (10.0) 590 (14.8)
Royal Marines 153 (3.2) 11 (3.0) 19 (4.0) 14 (5.1) 107 (2.9)
Army 3034 (61.4) 286 (80.6) 357 (76.1) 191 (69.4) 2169 (56.8)
Royal Air Force 1128 (21.9) 32 (8.3) 44 (8.9) 44 (15.5) 1001 (25.6)
Role in parent unit
Non-combat 4078 (81.2) 253 (70.6) 342 (72.0) 197 (72.6) 3252 (84.1)
Combat 900 (18.8) 101 (29.4) 129 (28.0) 74 (27.5) 587 (15.9)
Ever deployed
No 3260 (64.2) 202 (55.9) 271 (57.2) 158 (56.5) 2606 (66.7)
Yes 1760 (35.8) 157 (44.1) 203 (42.8) 118 (43.5) 1261 (33.4)
Missing values ranged from 16 (marital status) to 252 (educational qualifications).
Analyses are adjusted for non-response weights.
*In total, 5020 participants made up the follow-up sample; however, 44 participants were missing change in risky driving status.
NCO, non-commissioned officer; P1, phase 1; P2, phase 2.
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Factors associated with change from non-risky to risky
driving behaviours
Sociodemographic factors
The ﬁnding that younger people are more likely to
become risky drivers is consistent with reports from pre-
vious cohort studies.26 27 In addition, the ﬁnding that a
change in relationship status (from being in a relation-
ship to not being in a relationship) increases the likeli-
hood of becoming a risky driver adds to previous
evidence.5 Previous research demonstrates lower levels
of risky driving in soldiers reporting greater psychosocial
support.28 Furthermore, our ﬁndings demonstrate that
the probability of becoming a risky driver for those who
have never been in a relationship remains high.29 30
These ﬁndings are broadly consistent with our own
given that being in a relationship is likely to confer the
feeling of greater psychosocial support.
Other risk taking behaviours
Consistent with other studies,31–36 our study shows that
harmful alcohol use is associated with an increased risk
of becoming a risky driver.
Deployment
Previous analyses showed that deployment itself and also
traumatic experiences on deployment were associated
with risky driving but with a moderate effect size (those
with the highest rates of exposures to traumatic experi-
ences had an adjusted OR of becoming risky drivers of
1.69 (CI 1.31 to 2.18)).5 The current study shows that
Table 4 Variables associated with becoming a risky driver at P2, compared with not becoming a risky driver at P2, among
all non-risky drivers at P1 (N=4143)
Variable
Becomes risky
n (%) OR (95% CI)
AOR (95% CI)
Model 1
AOR (95% CI)
Model 2
Total 276/4143
Sociodemographic factors
Age change between P1 and P2 in years
(mean, SD)
3.33 (0.65)* 1.18 (0.98 to 1.43) 1.10 (0.91 to 1.34) –
Age group change
Remained under 35 years 140/1385 (10.4) 2.68 (2.02 to 3.54) 2.28 (1.14 to 2.43) 1.88 (1.37 to 2.59)
Became over 35 years 51/694 (7.6) 1.89 (1.32 to 2.70) 1.66 (1.14 to 2.43) 1.57 (1.06 to 2.30)
Stayed over 35 years 85/2063 (4.2) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Marital status change
In a relationship at P1 and P2 178/3111 (6.0) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Not in a relationship at P1 and P2 39/372 (11.2) 1.97 (1.36 to 2.85) 1.98 (1.35 to 2.92) 1.53 (1.02 to 2.30)
In a relationship at P1 and not at P2 33/275 (12.7) 2.27 (1.52 to 3.38) 2.21 (1.46 to 3.36) 1.67 (1.10 to 2.53)
Not in a relationship at P1 but in a
relationship at P2
25/364 (7.0) 1.18 (0.76 to 1.83) 1.08 (0.67 to 1.72) 0.87 (0.54 to 1.41)
Health factors
Alcohol misuse
Never a case 189/3509 (5.6) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Remained a case 31/168 (19.1) 3.97 (2.61 to 6.04) 3.46 (2.21 to 5.41) 2.83 (1.79 to 4.46)
Became a case 27/178 (16.1) 3.21 (2.07 to 4.98) 3.12 (2.00 to 4.87) 2.64 (1.67 to 4.17)
No longer a case 29/269 (11.2) 2.11 (1.39 to 3.20) 1.88 (1.21 to 2.93) 1.60 (1.02 to 2.53)
Had a RTA between questionnaires
No 261/3771 (6.8) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Yes 15/111 (14.2) 2.26 (1.29 to 3.98) 1.58 (0.83 to 3.01) 1.49 (0.77 to 2.89)
Military factors
Left service
Still serving 196/2884 (7.2) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Still not serving 25/414 (6.6) 0.91 (0.59 to 1.40) 0.87 (0.51 to 1.05) 1.06 (0.65 to 1.73)
Left service 53/799 (7.1) 0.99 (0.72 to 1.35) 1.01 (0.73 to 1.41) 1.15 (0.81 to 1.63)
Rejoined 0/25 (0.0) – – –
Deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan between questionnaires
No 158/2764 (6.0) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Yes 118/1379 (9.0) 1.54 (1.20 to 1.98) 1.44 (1.09 to 1.89) 1.26 (0.95 to 1.66)
Model 1: adjusted for P1 static variables (rank, service, childhood antisocial behaviour, education).
Model 2: adjusted for P1 static variables and dynamic variables (rank, service, childhood antisocial behaviour, education, age group change,
marital status change, deployed between questionnaires, alcohol misuse).
Missing values ranged from 19 (alcohol misuse) to 261 (had an RTA between questionnaires).
Analyses are adjusted for non-response weights.
*Age change among those staying non-risky: 3.27 years (SD 0.92).
AOR, adjusted OR; P1, phase 1; P2, phase 2; RTA, road traffic accident.
Sheriff RJS, et al. BMJ Open 2015;5:e008434. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2015-008434 5
Open Access
group.bmj.com on March 2, 2016 - Published by http://bmjopen.bmj.com/Downloaded from 
deployment after 2007 is associated with marginally less
reported deployment-related traumatic experiences.
Those deployed after 2007 were less likely to become
risky drivers following deployment, compared with those
deployed before 2007. This effect remains even after
adjusting for age group change and the small reduction
in traumatic events, and we therefore conclude that
other factors must account for some of this reduction in
risky driving rates.
We have identiﬁed two possible reasons for the reduc-
tion in the odds of becoming a risky driver in those
deployed after 2007. First, our results may reﬂect the
impact of the road safety campaign introduced in 2007
which attempted to encourage personnel to adopt safe
driving behaviours following deployment. This road
safety campaign is part of the third location decompres-
sion process,37 but the road safety presentation is the
only part to address risky driving. Second, the reduction
in reported risky driving following deployment may
reﬂect increased safety of driving while on deployment.
Deployment has been identiﬁed as a risk factor for
risky driving.5 28 In addition, a US study demonstrated
that multiple deployments and experiencing combat on
deployment were both strong predictors of motor
vehicle crashes after deployment.38 Since 2006, all UK
Armed Forces personnel from formed units returning
from deployment overseas have taken a brief period of
rest in a safe environment away from theatre and away
from home.37 Since 2007, this has involved a road safety
educational campaign focusing speciﬁcally on the post-
deployment period including the Grim Reaper video
presentation. This strategy targets a high-risk group.
The effectiveness of the road safety campaign is theor-
etically supported by a meta-analysis of the effect of road
safety campaigns on accidents.18 Unfortunately, it is difﬁ-
cult to directly compare our study with others as to our
knowledge no other study has investigated the protective
effect of a focused campaign on individuals who have
been exposed to a speciﬁc experience that increases
driving risk (in this case deployment).
There are some indications that in-theatre driving
practices have become more safety focused between
phases 1 and 2. Such a change may have affected driving
practices following deployment. While risky driving prac-
tices such as driving fast, reduced seatbelt use and rapid
lane changes may be necessary for high-risk situations
in-theatre on some occasions,39 the risk beneﬁt judge-
ment of such practices has changed over time. It is
plausible that reported risky driving following deploy-
ment is a reﬂection of learned behaviours on deploy-
ment which continue afterwards. There is some
evidence from the USA that combat driving behaviours
continue after deployment and that returning military
personnel can fall into these combat driving beha-
viours.40 Therefore, theoretically changes in in-theatre
driving practices may have reduced the reporting of
risky driving behaviours following recent deployments.
Meaning of the study
Encouragingly, reported risky driving behaviours in UK
military personnel have reduced over time. Our ﬁndings
are consistent with UK government statistics41 which
show that SMRs for all fatalities among UK regular
Armed Forces (regardless of when in the deployment
cycle the death occurred) due to land transport acci-
dents have reduced from 535 in 2006 to 143 in 2009,
compared with the UK general population.
Strengths and limitations
This is the ﬁrst study to assess changes in risky driver
status in the UK military. This is also a unique opportun-
ity to assess the utility of a road safety campaign to see if
it helped to reduce the probability of becoming risky
driver following deployment.
A possible source of response bias is that not all
responders completed the risky driving measures. Those
Table 5 Variables associated with becoming a risky driver at phase 2, among all non-risky drivers at phase 1 who deployed
between questionnaires (N=1379)
Variable Becomes risky n (%) OR (95% CI)
AOR (95% CI)
Model 1
AOR (95% CI)
Model 2
Years since last deployment (mean, SD) 1.83 (0.90)* 1.06 (0.85 to 1.32) 1.05 (0.83 to 1.32) 1.06 (0.83 to 1.35)
Deployment in relation to Grim Reaper video September 2007
Before 77/766 (10.7) 1.00 1.00 1.00
After 41/613 (6.9) 0.62 (0.42 to 0.93) 0.64 (0.42 to 0.98) 0.62 (0.40 to 0.95)
Number of traumatic deployment experiences at phase 2
No experiences 12/218 (5.6) 1.00 1.00 1.00
1–3 experiences 68/765 (9.4) 1.74 (0.91 to 3.30) 1.74 (0.88 to 3.45) 1.72 (0.86 to 3.14)
4+experiences 35/348 (10.6) 2.01 (1.01 to 4.0) 1.64 (0.77 to 3.49) 1.48 (0.69 to 3.14)
Model 1: adjusted for phase 1 static variables (rank, service, childhood antisocial behaviour, education).
Model 2: adjusted for phase 1 static variables and dynamic variables (rank, service, childhood antisocial behaviour, education, age group
change, marital status change, alcohol misuse).
Forty-nine participants missing value for number of traumatic deployment experiences.
Analyses are adjusted for non-response weights.
*Years since last deployment among non-risky: 1.79 years (SD 0.88).
AOR, adjusted OR.
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lost to follow-up at phase 2 were more likely to be risky
drivers at phase 1 (22%) compared with those followed
up (17%) introducing the possibility of bias. All analyses
have taken account of response weights; however,
residual bias may remain as only a limited number of
predictors were used to generate response weights.
The use of self-reported driving data is another poten-
tial source of bias. Self-reported driving behaviours may
not be an accurate reﬂection of actual driving beha-
viours, moreover the inaccuracy of the self-report may
be greater for some responders than for others. Studies
demonstrate that social desirability bias is associated to a
greater extent with under-reporting undesirable beha-
viours rather than over-reporting desirable behaviours.42
This is consistent with the distortion of self-reported
driving skills related to safety.43 In addition, social desir-
ability may affect responders differently depending on
various factors, such as sex (as has been seen in dietary
factors),44 or age (seen in self-reported drug and
alcohol use).45
We know from previous studies that ageing is likely to
be a major factor contributing to the reduced preva-
lence of risky driving,27 46–48 but it is difﬁcult to differen-
tiate the strength of the effect of age on the declining
risk in comparison to other factors. Therefore, we have
looked in detail at factors associated with a change from
non-risky to risky driving.
We suggest two possible reasons for the reduction in
risky driving behaviour that occurred in those deployed
after 2007; a road safety campaign and/or changes in
driving practices on deployment. Owing to the observa-
tional nature of this study, it is not possible to elucidate
which of these factors accounted for this. In order to
study the effects of the road safety campaign in depth, a
more robust evaluation methodology would need to be
adopted such as a cluster randomised controlled trial. In
addition, to the possible explanations outlined, we have
not looked at other factors (eg, mental health symp-
toms) that may explain some of the observed changes in
driving behaviours over time.
CONCLUSIONS
Among a cohort of UK military personnel, the preva-
lence of risky driving reduced from 18% to 14%, over an
average time period of 3.3 years. Younger age and a
history of alcohol misuse both predicted becoming a
risky driver between the two surveys. There is some evi-
dence that the military’s road safety campaign which
started in 2007 may have reduced the risk of becoming a
risky driver. However, changes in driving practices
during deployments after 2007 may also be responsible
for these changes in risky driving behaviours.
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